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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue to be addressed is whether the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act’s (ACA or “Obamacare”)1 manifest goal of promoting the general welfare of the
*
Professor, Thurgood Marshall School Of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D.,
University Of Mississippi. This Article was supported by a 2013 summer research grant from
Texas Southern University Thurgood Marshall School of Law. I give a special word of thanks
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helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119,
as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
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nation by encouraging states to expand their existing Medicaid plans2 is a coercive
use of Congress’ power under the Spending Clause3 if the federal government
permanently picks up at least 90 percent of the cost of the expansion. The Spending
Clause grants Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general
Welfare of the United States.”4 To make certain that federal money given to the
States is used to promote the general welfare of the people in a manner consistent
with the intent of Congress, it is necessary for Congress to have the power to place
restrictions on the States’ expenditure of federal dollars.5
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sebelius dramatically changed the Medicaid
expansion authority of Congress and unnecessarily created a confusing spending
power coercion landscape for courts and others trying to determine the impact of
Sebelius for any future attempt by Congress to expand or otherwise modify existing
Medicaid legislation.6 The Supreme Court should reverse its Medicaid holding in
Sebelius and return to the position it adopted more than seventy-five years ago:
Refusing to place unreasonable limits on the use of the spending power by
Congress.7 Beginning in 1937, the Supreme Court moved away from placing Tenth
Amendment restrictions on the Spending Clause Power granted to Congress, which
had the practical effect of authorizing Congress to provide instructions on subjects
traditionally managed by state governments, provided that Congress connected
conformity with those federal instructions to the delivery of federal dollars.8 Since
the states have the ability to simply refuse federal dollars, states have a reasonable
choice of whether or not to embrace the instructions intended by the conditions
established for those federal dollars, and as a result, the states have not lost any of its
sovereign authority.9 In Sebelius, a state could avoid federal spending power
coercion by not accepting the offer of federal dollars.10 In Sebelius, the Court finally
acted on its warnings in South Dakota v. Dole that legislation enacted by Congress
under the Spending Clause from the 1930s to 2010 was subject to affirmative

152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). When mentioning the ACA, I write about the ACA as amended by
Pub. L. No. 111-152.
2

ACA § 2001(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)).

3

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

4

Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2633 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
5

Id.; see, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).

6

Susan Feigin Harris, Healthcare Reform, the Supreme Court, and the Election: Is it
Over Yet?, 50 HOUS. LAWYER 14, 17-18 (2013).
7

Reeve T. Bull, The Virtue of Vagueness: A Defense of South Dakota v. Dole, 56 DUKE
L.J. 279, 283 (2006).
8
Id. at 283-84 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937)) (approving
many sections of the Social Security Act that produced a very appealing enticement for states
to set up their own unemployment compensation regulations).
9
10

Id. at 284 (citing Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 596).
Id. (citing Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947)).
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limits.11 Because all modern Spending Clause decisions before Sebelius validated the
conditioning of federal dollars, Sebelius gave Congress explicit notice that its
excessively coercive conditioning of Medicaid funds did not pass constitutional
muster.12
In Sebelius, one could simply conclude that Chief Justice Roberts provided
notice to Congress that it may condition only a percentage of major federal funding
upon compliance by a state without invading that states’ right of sovereignty. Chief
Justice Roberts’ coercion notice to Congress in Sebelius is vague and flawed because
it fails to provide an understandable constitutional line that Congress shall not
cross.13 In Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts wrote what will no doubt be regarded as
extremely confounding language for healthcare policy makers, lawyers, scholars,
and other interested parties endeavoring to understand the implication of the
Spending Clause coercion rationale for future amendments to the Medicaid law.14
Unfortunately, Chief Justice Roberts articulated the belief that the Supreme Court
did not need to fix a recognizable line for determining when Spending Clause
coercion violation occurred.15 Chief Justice Roberts appears to be approving
arbitrary line-drawing on the Medicaid expansion issue by stating that, “[i]t is
enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it.”16
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion concurring in Sebelius kept the Medicaid expansion
provision from being held completely invalid. Justice Ginsburg posed an influential
question regarding future Medicaid expansion: “When future Spending Clause
challenges arrive, as they likely will in the wake of today’s decision, how will
litigants and judges assess whether ‘a State has a legitimate choice whether to accept
the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds?”17 Chief Justice Roberts’ very
confounding language forces litigants and judges to determine the meaning of future
amendments to the Medicaid law without any meaningful coercion criteria
guidelines. I do not believe judges or litigants have a reliable set of criteria from the
Supreme Court for assessing whether a state has a non-coercive choice in accepting
federal requirements in exchange for federal money.
Part II of this Article provides a concise contention from a historical perspective
that the Supreme Court has consistently refused to apply the unconstitutional
conditions theory to any actual case as a violation of the Spending Clause prior to
Sebelius. Part III analyzes the implication of the political question doctrine and other
universal jurisprudential values for avoiding the endless judicial difficulties of
resolving the Medicaid and spending power coercion issue presented in Sebelius.
Part IV contends the Court in Sebelius incorrectly refused to give deference to
Congress by using a Tenth Amendment states’ rights rationale to conclude the
ACA’s Medicaid expansion plan was an unconstitutional coercive exercise of the
11

Id. at 303 (citing Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
643, 652 (1996)).
12

See id.

13

See id. at 303-04.

14

Feigin Harris, supra note 6, at 19.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 19-20.
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spending power. Part V asserts that the Supreme Court should apply the rational
basis test for deciding whether Congress creates an unconstitutional coercive
condition in violation of the spending power by requiring a participating state to
accept reasonable federal changes that promote the general welfare.
II. FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE PRIOR TO SEBELIUS, THE SUPREME COURT HAS
CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO APPLY THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS THEORY
TO ANY ACTUAL CASE AS A VIOLATION OF THE SPENDING CLAUSE
The Supreme Court has virtually without fail respected Congress’ ability to
provide instructions regarding spending conditions placed on federal grants, and the
Court has insisted that States follow those instructions.18 The Medicaid program was
produced in 1965, after Congress included Title XIX in the Social Security Act with
the goal of giving federal financial assistance to States that decided to reimburse
particular expenses for medical treatment for needy people.19 During the last fifty
years, the Supreme Court has refused to place unnecessary restrictions on the ability
of Congress to provide instructions for the Medicaid program, but the Court changed
all that in a significant way in its June 28, 2012 Sebelius opinion.20
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Sebelius rejects the Court’s prior approach in
approving the federal/state accommodating schemes for the Medicaid program.21
The cornerstone of the federal/state Medicaid accommodating scheme is financial
payment by both the Federal Government and the sharing State.22 Nothing in Title
XIX as originally enacted, or in its legislative history, suggests that Congress
promised a participating State that subsequent legislation by Congress could not
require a participating State to assume the responsibility of expanding the pool of
needy individuals eligible for health services in its Medicaid plan.23 It is very clear
that the purpose of Congress in enacting Title XIX and the ACA was to give federal
financial support for all legitimate state payments under an approved Medicaid
plan.24 Under the rationale adopted by the Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae, a
participating State that fails to expand its Medicaid Plan as required under the ACA
is no longer an approved Medicaid plan and therefore, is not entitled to any federal
funding for any portion of its Medicaid plan.25
As a matter of judicial precedent, the Supreme Court has specifically established
Congress’ right to condition a State‘s acceptance of Medicaid dollars on submission
18

Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2633 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
19

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).

20

Michael H. Cook & Jennifer L. Evans, National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius—What Does it Mean to the Future of Medicaid and Healthcare Reform?, 6 J.
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 88, 91 (2013) (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566).
21

Id. at 92; see also Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

22

McRae, 448 U.S. at 308.

23

Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 89-404, pt. 1, at 83-85 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 89-213, at 72-74
(1965); 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943).
24

Id.

25

Id. at 309.
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to the requirements Congress created for involvement in the program.26 While
involvement in the Medicaid program is totally optional, once a State elects to play a
part, it is obliged to comply with the terms of Title XIX or any other subsequent and
reasonable amendment to the Medicaid law enacted by Congress while exercising its
power under the Spending Clause.27 The Sebelius decision adopted an unprecedented
position by severely restricting the federal government‘s power to enforce an ACA
provision that encourages states to expand its Medicaid plans to become more
inclusive by enlarging the beneficiary population also in need of help.28
Before the 2011 Term, not a single Supreme Court judgment since the New Deal
had invalidated any Congressional legislation as violating the spending
clause.29More precisely, the specific issue of unconstitutionally coercive conditions
analyzed by the Supreme Court in Sebelius was unusual as well. As a matter of fact,
not a single federal court had ever concluded that any federal legislation created an
unconstitutionally coercive use of the spending power30 before the Court’s
pronouncement in Sebelius.31 The only two Supreme Court cases discussing the
spending power coercion policy concluded that it did not apply and held that the
federal unemployment-compensation provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935
were valid in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,32 and the Court also validated the
drinking-age condition imposed on highway funds in South Dakota v. Dole.33 In
those two cases, the Court accepted a hypothetical chance of a federal-spending plan
to unconstitutionally coerce states. However, the court concluded that the factual
evidence in the two cases demonstrated that actual coercion did not exist.34 Before
Sebelius, spending clause coercion had been properly downgraded to that branch of
case law involving dicta and theory.35
26

Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2633 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see McRae, 448 U.S. at 309.

27

Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2633; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396f (1976).

28

Cook & Evans, supra note 20, at 91-92.

29

Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging Into Endless
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013) (citing Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337, 1355
(4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig, J., dissenting) (“I recognize that the Court has not invalidated an Act
of Congress under the Spending Clause since United States v. Butler, over half a century
ago.”), rev'd en banc, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997)); accord Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d
1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Most of the treatment given the [coercion] theory in the federal
courts has been negative.”); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The
coercion theory has been much discussed but infrequently applied in federal case law, and
never in favor of the challenging party.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1430-32 (1989)).
30

Id. at 3 (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“The Chief Justice therefore—for the first time ever—finds an exercise of Congress'
spending power unconstitutionally coercive.”)).
31

Id. (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (plurality opinion)).

32

Id. (citing Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585-93 (1937)).

33

Id. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987)).

34

Id.

35

Id.
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III. THE IMPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND OTHER
UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENTIAL VALUES FOR AVOIDING THE ENDLESS JUDICIAL
DIFFICULTIES OF RESOLVING THE MEDICAID AND SPENDING POWER COERCION ISSUE
PRESENTED IN SEBELIUS
In Sebelius,36 the US Supreme Court tackled a complex constitutional law case
by unfortunately allowing different worlds to inhabit the opinion: “one legal, one
imagined, and one based in concrete facts about the real world.”37 Following one of
the most time-consuming oral arguments in current Supreme Court history,38 the
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, concluded that the
penalty sections of the Medicaid expansion sections were unacceptably coercive, and
the penalty section of the Medicaid extension section of the act may be severed from
the ACA.39 Under the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Medicaid
expansion requirement is a valid exercise of the spending power as long as Congress
does not impose any penalty on any state currently participating in the Medicaid
Program for rejecting the federal request for Medicaid expansion under the ACA.40
Chief Justice Roberts judicial behavior toward the Medicaid expansion penalty
created a spending power coercion world that was disconnected from federalism
reality.41 The chief justice correctly concluded that the law involving federal grantin-aid projects has constantly indicated that the federal government conceivably
could exceed its spending power limits and coerce a state hooked on federal dollars
to engage in an activity that it would not have otherwise engaged.42 Because the
intricacy of recognizing a difference between incentives and challenging
arrangements from coercion is so problematic, the Supreme Court had never ever
concluded that Congress had violated the coercion limit on the spending power.43
Chief Justice Roberts’ application of the coercion doctrine to limit the spending
power of Congress in Sebelius is completely original and dangerous. For the first
time in United States history, the Court concludes that spending power coercion
exists in a mutually accommodating federal grant-in-aid venture but it does not
realistically provide guidance on how to establish the difference between coercion
and inducement or negotiation and duress.44 The line of attack utilized by Chief
Justice Roberts in avoiding these concerns strongly suggests that the Chief Justice
has closed his eyes to the Medicaid statute, its ensuing enactment history, as well as

36

Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

37

Jerry L. Mashaw, Legal, Imagined, and Real Worlds: Reflections on National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 255, 257
(2013).
38

Id. at 256.

39

Id. at 257.

40

Id. at 256-57.

41

Id. at 262.

42

Id. at 262-63.

43

Id. at 263.

44

Id.
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earlier judgments rendered by the Supreme Court.45 One commentator has correctly
concluded that Chief Justice Roberts’ rationale regarding the Medicaid expansion
amendments and the coercion issue in Sebelius is extremely harmful and
destructive.46 The rationale articulated by Justice Roberts encourages lower courts to
discover coercion in whichever of the hundreds of state and federal mutuallyaccommodating subsidized projects now in operation should Congress decide to
adjust and make involvement in the adjusted program a condition of taking part in
the program at all.47 Under the position taken by the Chief Justice, programs with
settled expectations and popularity with state citizens would appear to be beyond
amendment by Congress.48 “To be sure, lower courts will be able to avoid this silly
result, if they want to do so. But the Supreme Court has given those courts no usable
standard on which to distinguish coercion from bargain.”49
I agree with the position that conflicting opinions of the Justices concerning
Medicaid expansion and unconstitutional spending power coercion encourages a
state to now presume that its programs with settled expectations and popularity with
state citizens are now virtually beyond amendment by Congress. Since the Court
failed to provide standards to distinguish coercion from bargain, any future warning
from Congress advising a state that it does not intend to continue providing money
for programs it previously funded may now give states a plausible basis to argue
spending power coercion.50 Justices Ginsburg and her group of justices argued that
the Medicaid expansion is constitutional as enacted.51 The Dissenting Justices
contended that the entire Medicaid expansion section of the law was coercive and
unconstitutional and could not be saved.52 The Court held that it would save
Medicaid by denying DHHS the authority to withhold all of the existing Medicaid
money.53 Under the Medicaid expansion approved by the Supreme Court those,
states that choose not to participate in the expansion may be denied only the money
intended to help them implement the expansion.54 Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor
concurred with the prevailing position to save a version of the Medicaid Expansion
that is not consistent with the intent of Congress.55 The Sebelius decision prohibiting
Congress from withholding existing Medicaid money as coercive declared the States
as separate and independent sovereigns and is the most significant Supreme Court

45

Id.

46

Id. at 265.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Maureen Mullen Dove, The Obamacare Decision: Does Anyone Know What it Means?,
46 MD. B.J. 28, 30 (2013).
51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.
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judgment up until now, describing the restrictive nature of Congress’ spending
power.56
Maureen Mullen Dove, a retired Deputy General of Maryland, provides an
excellent, concise statement regarding the practical effect of the Court approving a
limited version of the Medicaid expansion enacted by congress.57As a practical
matter, the real impact of the Sebelius Medicaid expansion holding will be on State
budgetary choices.58 “The decision dramatically reduces the pressure for States to
accept the Medicaid expansion or other federal grants. Its effect will also limit
Congress’ ability to direct State implementation of other jointly funded programs by
threatening withdrawal of federal funds.”59 However, Justice Ginsburg believes
Congress could severely limit the state budgetary choices by simply repealing the
existing Medicaid project and establishing a new version to include new people in
need.60 If Justice Ginsburg’s theory is correct, the petitioning States might be
thwarted; however, it is not likely that Congress will be able to implement Justice
Ginsburg’s theory to create new health care legislation in the future to expand
coverage for poor adults because of the harsh reality of partisan politics.61
Although I agree that Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning is not clear and provides
no significant criteria by which to determine coerciveness, I believe the future
impact of the opinion is fairly easy to predict.62 As a result of Roberts’ reasoning,
everyone may easily predict that there will be many legal challenges to the Medicaid
expansion analysis.63 Chief Justice Roberts’ Medicaid expansion coercion theory is
seriously flawed because it is vague and fails to adequately identify either the total
sum or proportion of federal money at risk of being denied or the standard to
properly measure when substantive changes to the Medicaid program actually create
unconstitutional coercion.64 Chief Justice Roberts’ coercion rationale in Sebelius
demonstrates that he has joined those Circuit courts which have consistently
demonstrated an inability to apply Spending Clause doctrine to the federal healthcare
projects in a significant way.65
In the lower federal court cases, states claim that participation in Medicaid is
involuntary coercion because a state’s medical arrangement would collapse without
federal Medicaid money are not new and have been consistently rejected66 before
Sebelius. A state’s involuntary-participation coercion Medicaid theory that is based
56

Id. at 32.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Contra id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for
States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 453 (2008).
66

Id. at 457.
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on the allegation that a state could simply not afford to lose its federally-funded
Medicaid programs was consistently rejected by the lower federal courts,67 but
accepted by the Supreme Court in Sebelius. In West Virginia v. U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services,68 a Fourth Circuit decision concerning a Tenth
Amendment dispute regarding the “estate recovery” conditions that were attached to
the Medicaid plan in 1993 by Congress, the appellate court correctly acknowledged
that the limit of the Spending Clause power does not allow Congress to manipulate
pressure into compulsion.69 However, the Fourth Circuit rejected West Virginia’s
claim that the estate recovery section was coercive and prohibited by the Tenth
Amendment.70 While recognizing that conjecture regarding spending power coercion
existed because of dicta in Dole, the Fourth Circuit concluded in 2002 that the
Supreme Court failed to give reliable direction on the boundary between influence
and compulsion, thus several courts have demonstrated judicial restraint by treating
spending power coercion as a political question.71
The political question doctrine involves an intermingling of conditions under
which courts correctly consider whether a specific issue in litigation is justiciable—
to be precise, whether the question is right and proper for judicial resolution by
courts.72 The purpose of the political question doctrine is to implement the separation
of powers doctrine.73 Because of Article III, the separation of powers doctrine
requires courts to give relevant deference to the other co-equal branches of the
federal government when exercising those constitutional powers assigned to the
courts.74 In Baker, the Supreme Court recognized six situations in which a question
may put forward a political question:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.75

67

Id.

68

West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2002).

69

Huberfeld, supra note 65, at 459.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 459-60 (citing West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 289).

72

Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1431 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

73

Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).

74

Id.

75

Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
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Baker instituted the standard that if one of these factors is present, the case could
be dismissed as a political question.76 According to Justice Sotomayor, “Baker left
unanswered when the presence of one or more factors warrants dismissal, as well as
the interrelationship of the six factors and the relative importance of each in
determining whether a case is suitable for adjudication.”77 I believe a functional
application of the Baker factors to the Medicaid Expansion issue presented in
Sebelius presents appropriate plausible justifications for refusing to give judgment
on the merits of the spending power dispute between a state and the federal
government. The utilization of one or more of the six Baker factors under the
problematic political question doctrine in order to justify denying a state its
requested remedy in Sebelius is not required and should not be required under the
rationale of Professor Henkin.78
According to Professor Louis Henkin, “The ‘political question’ doctrine, . . . is
an unnecessary, deceptive packaging of several established doctrines that has misled
lawyers and courts to find in it things that were never put there and make it far more
than the sum of its parts.”79 Nevertheless, Professor Henkin contends the political
question doctrine possessed some universal jurisprudential values, and only
confusion is created by giving those universal values special treatment in preferred
cases.80 Professor Henkin argues that existing universal jurisprudential values
contained in the following five suggestions renders the confusing political question
doctrine unnecessary:
1. The courts are bound to accept decisions by the political branches
within their constitutional authority.
2. The courts will not find limitations or prohibitions on the powers of the
political branches where the Constitution does not prescribe any.
3. Not all constitutional limitations or prohibitions imply rights and
standing to object in favor of private parties.
4. The courts may refuse some (or all) remedies for want of equity.
5. In principle, finally, there might be constitutional provisions which can
properly be interpreted as wholly or in part “self-monitoring” and not the
subject of judicial review.81
Professor Henkin’s five suggestions demonstrate how the court in Sebelius could
have denied a state its requested remedy to be exempt from the Medicaid expansion
requirement without suffering the penalty of losing all of its Medicaid funding
without utilizing or recognizing the political question doctrine. First, in Sebelius, the
Court could have refused to hear a state’s Medicaid Expansion challenge because the
Spending Clause grants Congress the power to provide for the general Welfare of the
United States, and Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 allows Congress to use this power to establish the
76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Louis Henkin, Is there a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597, 621-22
(1976).
79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 622-23.
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type of cooperative state-federal agreement created under the ACA’s Medicaid
Expansion program.82 Second, in Sebelius, the Court could have avoided hearing the
ACA Medicaid challenge because the Constitution does not recognize a spending
power violation by a Congressional mandate that a state which would like to
continue receiving federal Medicaid dollars must now promote the general welfare
of its poor citizens under the ACA by offering them an opportunity to receive
healthcare coverage. Since the Spending Clause does not preclude the Secretary
from withholding Medicaid funds as authorized by Congress based on a state’s
refusal to comply with the expanded Medicaid program, the Court has refused to
grant a state its requested remedy. Third, in Sebelius, the Court could have refused to
hear the ACA Medicaid challenge because the Constitution does not limit or prohibit
Congress from offering an individual or a state a fair and reasonable opportunity to
receive or reject all of its Medicaid Funds. Fourth, in Sebelius, the Court could have
rejected the ACA Medicaid Expansion litigation because a state seeking a remedy
has failed to make a case for equity in seeking to maintain its Medicaid dollars while
not meeting the new reasonable and under-the-circumstances conditions for
continuing federal dollars. The equity rationale for rejecting the Medicaid challenge
by the states very strongly supports a denial of the opportunity to be heard on the
merits by a participating state because since the beginning, the Medicaid Act gave
states a warning that the program could be altered, amended, or repealed.83 Ever
since 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1304 has continuously provided as follows: “The right to
alter, amend, or repeal any provision of [Medicaid] . . . is hereby reserved to the
Congress.”84 Because Congress gave the states fair warning that it was keeping the
right to “alter, amend, or repeal” a spending program, Congress provided full notice
of its plan to keep comprehensive and complete power to modify the program as a
proper exercise of its legislative power over the states challenging the ACA
Medicaid expansion and therefore, should be denied an opportunity to be heard in
court under the equity rationale.85
The Supreme Court’s judgment and rationale in Bowen v. Public Agencies
Opposed to Social Security Entrapment could serve as persuasive justification for
applying the equity concept to deny the States an opportunity to a full hearing on the
merits of the Medicaid expansion challenge based on spending power coercion.86
When authorized in 1935, the Social Security Act did not include state employees.87
Reacting to coercion from States seeking to include its employees, Congress, in
1950, changed the Act to permit States to choose to participate in the program.88 The
federal law granting States this initial freedom of choice deliberately allowed States
82

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).

83
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2638 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
84

Id.

85

See id.

86

See id. (citing Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41,
51-52 (1986)).
87

See id. (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 44).

88

See id. (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 45).
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the right to leave the program.89 Starting in the 1970s, an expanding number of
States used the option to depart.90
Troubled by the fact that departures were maltreating Social Security, Congress
repealed the termination stipulation in the law.91 Congress, by exercising its repeal
power, changed Social Security from a voluntary plan for the States to one from
which the States could not run away from or avoid.92 California challenged the
repeal, claiming that the alteration was not valid because it denied California the
right to leave the Social Security program.93 The Supreme Court unanimously
refused to accept California’s line of reasoning.94 Because Congress incorporated in
the Social Security Act “a clause expressly reserving to it ‘[t]he right to alter, amend,
or repeal any provision’ of the Act,” the Supreme Court appropriately concluded that
Congress gave the States adequate notice that the Social Security Act did not
establish any contractual rights for the State of California or any other state.95 As a
result, the States did not have any legal basis on which to challenge the Social
Security amendment, even with the considerable nature of the change.96
Fifth, in Sebelius, the Court could reject the ACA Medicaid Expansion lawsuits
filed by the States because spending money to provide for the general welfare is part
of the cooperative political responsibility federalism existing between Congress and
the States. Cooperative political responsibility federalism should be construed as a
“self-monitoring”97 process that does not truly involve economic coercion because
no one actually forces a state to accept free money, to provide or improve healthcare
to eligible people living in the state. While rejecting the political question doctrine,
Professor Hinkle correctly concludes that the Court has a duty to accept the
constitutional reality that there are political responsibilities rooted in the political
branches—and whether and how these political duties are implemented typically
does not present an issue for review by the courts.98 Since cooperative political
responsibilities to promote the general welfare are a self-monitoring process, it
should be exempt from judicial review.99When a state accepts money from the
federal government under a Medicaid federal cooperative program, spending power
economic coercion does not exist because a State volunteers to accept free money to
improve the healthcare of its residents.
The Constitution has simply not ordained judges and courts as an “ombudsmen
for all legislative inadequacies” because the judicial resolution is not to provide a
89

Id. at 2638 (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 45).

90

See id. (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 46).

91

See id.

92

See id. (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 48).

93

See id. at 2638-39 (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 49-50).

94

See id. at 2639 (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 51-53).

95

Id. (quoting Bowen, 477 U.S. at 51-52).

96

Id.

97

Henkin, supra note 78, at 623.

98

Id. at 624.

99

See id. at 622-23.
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helpful remedy for every injury.100 The restraint on judicial involvement does not
depend on an unnecessary political question doctrine to withdraw from a particular
group of cases because the separation of powers doctrine assigned political duties to
the federal legislative and executive branches.101 The political question doctrine
realized its glory days during the New Deal Court by Justices who were chosen to
bring back judicial self-restraint and let those elected to Congress make the rules.102
The issues which those New Deal Justices addressed “seemed particularly fitting for
legislative rather than judicial rule and particularly fitting occasions to build fences
against future judicial incursions.”103 As asserted by Justice Ginsburg in Sebelius, the
dividing line between spending power coercion is more appropriate for legislative,
rather than judicial, problem solving. “The coercion inquiry, therefore, appears to
involve political judgments that defy judicial calculation.”104 Selected commentators
supportive of a vigorous application of Dole’s spending power restrictions presume
that a theory of “impermissible coercion” based on the belief that a State apparently
lacks the ability to turn down federal money is really and truly too extremely vague
and unstructured to be judicially supervised.105
The position that the States’ overdependence on federal dollars restricts
Congress’ power to amend or expand the Medicaid program under the Spending
Clause is wrong because it is the constitutional responsibility of Congress and not
the States to spend federal money to provide for the general welfare of the people.106
Each succeeding Congress is authorized to disperse money as it considers necessary
or proper.107 The 110th Congress was free to make a decision regarding Medicaid
finances that modified the product produced by a prior Congress. In fact a
succeeding Congress could deny the States money they were hopeful of receiving
based on the action of a past Congress without violating the spending power
coercion theory.108 To allow the States to restrict Congress’ ability to make
subsequent changes to a conditional Medicaid grant encourages the states to
collectively or individually use the Spending Clause to coerce Congress into
economic submission to the States. When Congress is required by the courts to
continue granting money to the States based on the original terms of the conditional
grants without the ability to subsequently change the terms of the original
conditional grant, Congress has been coerced by the States receiving the money on
their own terms rather than the terms set by Congress.

100

Id. at 624-25

101

Id. at 625.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2641 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
105

Id. (citing Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole, 78 IND. L. J. 459,
521-22, n.307 (2003)).
106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id.
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In West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. United States Department of Health and
Human Services, the federal district court abided by the Supreme Court advice to
lower courts to maneuver away from issues asking courts to determine when federal
encouragement to meet the terms of a condition in a grant produces unacceptable
coercion.109 Although Justice Roberts concluded in Sebelius that the States had
suffered Spending Clause coercion, he also failed, like all of the other judges, to
identify a single court that had discovered the time in which encouragement became
coercion. 110 It is not surprising that not a single judge has been able to actually
identify when spending power coercion has occurred because according to Professor
Kathleen Sullivan, an empirical explanation of when coercion occurs is virtually
impossible to ascertain.111 The federal district court appropriately refused to accept
West Virginia’s self-serving contention that its statutory choice of participating in
the federal estate recovery plan was unconstitutionally coerced.112 The district court
held that the execution of an estate recovery plan as a condition of getting federal
Medicaid dollars is permitted by the spending power.113 In Sebelius, spending power
jurisprudence would have been well served if the Supreme Court had simply rejected
the States’ self-serving contention that its statutory choice of participating in the
ACA federal Medicaid expansion plan created unconstitutional coercion. The
Supreme Court should have followed the rationale of the federal district in West
Virginia and held that participation in the Medicaid expansion plan as a condition of
continuing to receive federal Medicaid dollars is permitted by the spending power.
IV. THE COURT IN SEBELIUS INCORRECTLY REFUSED TO GIVE DEFERENCE TO
CONGRESS BY USING A TENTH AMENDMENT STATES’ RIGHTS RATIONALE TO
CONCLUDE THE ACA’S MEDICAID EXPANSION PLAN WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
COERCIVE EXERCISE OF THE SPENDING POWER
Public servants on behalf of twenty-six states, two non-public plaintiffs, as well
as the National Federation of Independent Business, challenged the Medicaid
expansion as a violation of the Tenth Amendment right of a state to be free of
spending power coercion.114 The state plaintiffs made the claim that the Medicaid
expansion violated both the spending power and the Tenth Amendment’s reservation
of definite powers to the states.115 Congress is not authorized to use its spending
power to “coerce” the states into submission with the federal objective.116 Under the
109
West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 132 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (S.D.
W. Va. 2001).
110

See id.

111

Id. (citing Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1428).

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2011),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012).
115

Id. at 1264 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. X; Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 585 (1937); West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281,
286-87 (4th Cir. 2002)).
116

Id.
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Spending Clause, the coercion test raises an issue of whether the federal plan denies
a state a choice about meeting the conditions for receiving federal dollars and
induces the state to take action because the state, in effect, has no other choice.117
Initially, the coercion doctrine received significant analysis by the Supreme
Court in Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis.118 In that case, a corporation
disputed the obligation to pay an employment tax required by the recently approved
Social Security Act.119 The corporation contended that the federal government
inappropriately coerced states into making a contribution to the Social Security
program.120 The Supreme Court appropriately rejected the corporation’s challenge to
the employment tax because the corporation failed to make a distinction between
motive and coercion.121 Every condition placed on the receipt of money is analogous
to a tax because to some degree, it is regulatory.122 To some extent, receiving federal
dollars is similar to paying a tax because taxes place an economic burden on the
activity that is taxed as compared with a similar activity that is not taxed, and state
activity receiving federal funds may have regulatory burdens that do not apply to
another state activity.123 Every reimbursement from a tax when based upon conduct
is comparatively an enticement.124 However, to claim that purpose or enticement is
equal to spending power coercion is to unnecessarily create a spending clause
jurisprudence that is an unconstitutional stumbling block that restricts the power of
Congress.125 Asserting that lawful purpose and enticement equals spending power
coercion is too much a fatalistic view toward the freedom of choice in making policy
determinations about adopting public policy to promote the general welfare.126 The
law should be directed by a common sense understanding which presupposes that a
freedom of choice exists between the federal government and the states on solving
problems that are an impediment to promoting the general welfare.127 Nothing in the
Sebelius case supports the conclusion that the federal government had exercised
power over the states similar to undue influence. It is indeed fair to assume that the
undue influence concept should rarely, if ever, be applied to the interaction between
the state and federal bodies.128 “Even on that assumption the location of the point at
which pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, would be a
question of degree, at times, perhaps, of fact.”129 What is truly an amazing fact
regarding Sebelius is the Supreme Court’s unilateral decision to address the ACA
117

Id.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id.
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Id. (citing Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937)).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.

125

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. (quoting Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937)).
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Medicaid expansion requirement as a spending power coercion issue because all the
federal circuits came to the same conclusion that the Medicaid expansion was a valid
exercise of the power of Congress.130 Although no single inferior court had
proclaimed that the Medicaid expansion violated the constitution, the Supreme Court
mysteriously created the spending power Medicaid expansion coercion issue and
then approved the petition for certiorari on the Medicaid issue.131
In Sebelius, the Court held that the Tenth Amendment functions as a check on
Congress’ authority to spend for the general welfare once objectionable conditions
are placed on states’ receipt of those federal payments.132 Although Sebelius will
encourage many more novel coercion objections to federal conditional spending
plans, the Supreme Court has left the lower courts with very little direction and
judicially manageable standards to address future spending power litigation by
basing coercion on a vague standard.133 The Court’s flawed spending power coercion
theory has unnecessarily created “difficulties for lower courts attempting to decide
coercion challenges, legislators drafting new conditional spending programs, and
federal agencies administering existing Spending Clause programs [that] are
profound. For every federal spending program since the Great Society, this case
signals the beginning of a new era of litigation challenges.”134
In Sebelius, the expanded Medicaid mandate was considered coercive because
the Court implemented its lack of judicial deference to Congress rationale as applied
to the Commerce Clause regulation in 1995 in United States v. Lopez135 to the federal
spending power under the Spending Clause.136 Connecting the spending power
coercion theory to the lack of deference to Congress’ use of its commerce clause
power in Lopez provides a basis for understanding the lack of judicial deference to
the power of Congress to promote cooperative federalism spending power projects.
In Lopez, the Court believed if it were to accept the Government’s point of view
regarding the possession of guns at school, it would be very difficult for the Court to
conceive of any undertaking by a person that Congress does not have the power to
regulate under its commerce power.137 In Sebelius, the Court refused to accept the
Government’s point of view regarding the Medicaid Expansion.138 Because of a lack
of judicial respect for Congress, it was very easy for the Court to conceive of
Medicaid Expansion by Congress as a pragmatic coercive effort by the federal
government to demand considerable and unforeseeable expenditures from the states
that are currently involved in a continuing federal spending plan as a violation of the

130

Huberfeld, Weeks Leonard & Outterson, supra note 29, at 30.

131

Id.

132

Id. at 6.

133

Id.

134

Id.
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United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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See id. at 549.
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Id. at 564.
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Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012).
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spending power.139 The Sebelius coercion occurs even if the states were presented
with the option to accept the ACA’s additional terms and conditions or leave
Medicaid completely.140 The states, in effect, were coerced by lack of a sensible
choice.141 In Sebelius, the Court’s conclusion that the States suffered spending power
coercion under the Medicaid expansion exists because of the Lopez lack of judicial
deference reality. In Lopez, the Court demonstrated a lack of judicial deference to a
Congressional exercise of its commerce clause power.142 While in Sebelius, the
Court followed the line of reasoning established in Lopez and did not give any
deference to Congressional use of the spending clause power.143
The Supreme Court‘s decisions in Lopez and Sebelius was a return to the
rationale utilized in National League of Cities v. Usery because in those three
judicial opinions, the Supreme Court gave the States a constitutional shield against
specific types of federal requirements that were clearly within the reasonable scope
of the enumerated power of Congress.144 Throughout Sebelius, the Court simply
utilized the Tenth Amendment to justify imposing a judicially created affirmative
restriction on the scope of the national spending power of Congress.145 In Sebelius,
the Supreme Court took the position that the Tenth Amendment operated as a
substantive tool to place affirmative limits on the federal spending power, even in
the Medicaid Expansion field to which a non-coercive federal constitutional
spending power was presumed to be real and available to Congress.146
If the Court in Sebelius had followed Justice Blackmun’s rationale in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,147 which overruled National League of
Cities’ approach of rejecting the “traditional governmental functions” doctrine, it
would have concluded the spending power coercion theory did not prohibit Congress
from giving states a choice to adopt Medicaid expansion to avoid losing its Medicaid
funds. Professor James F. Blumstein acknowledges that Justice Blackmun
recognized in Garcia that the traditional governmental function approach was
inherently flawed because it failed to serve as an informative principle of Tenth
Amendment limitations on the enumerated powers of Congress.148 Similar to the
traditional governmental functions restriction on the Tenth Amendment States’
rights issue, the spending power coercion prohibition is also fatally flawed because it
139

James F. Blumstein, NFIB v. Sebelius and Enforceable Limits on Federal Leveraging:
The Contract Paradigm, the Clear Notice Rule, and the Coercion Principle, 6 J. HEALTH &
LIFE SCI. L. 123, 135 (2013).
140

See id. at 129.

141

Id. at 137-38.

142

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

143

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012).

144

See James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing
Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1283 (1994) [hereinafter Blumstein, Federalism] (citing
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
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See id.
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See id.
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Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
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Blumstein, Federalism, supra note 144, at 1283-84.
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is too vague to provide an informative principle of Tenth Amendment limitations on
the enumerated Spending Clause power of Congress.
In Garcia, Justice Blackmun, who had concurred and supplied the necessary fifth
vote in National League of Cities, abandoned the traditional governmental function
paradigm of National League of Cities as unreasonable and impractical, as well as
incompatible with the customary doctrine of federalism.149 In my view, the Supreme
Court should abandon the spending power paradigm approved in Sebelius as also
unreasonable and impractical, as well as incompatible with the customary doctrine of
cooperative spending power federalism as applied to Medicaid. Because the
traditional governmental functions theory did not provide much analytical guidance
in determining which state functions were traditional and beyond the reach of federal
power and which state functions were not traditional and within the reach of the
federal power, the theory was properly rejected in Garcia.150 Since the spending
power theory in Sebelius does not provide any meaningful analytical direction in
determining which federal expenditures for Medicaid are coercive, it fails to meet
the criteria articulated by the Court in Dole.151 Justice Ginsburg correctly states that
Sebelius “does not present the concerns that led the Court in Dole even to consider
the prospect of coercion.”152 Because Sebelius is a simple case, the Court’s analysis
is very troubling and disturbing. Congress, endeavoring to help the disadvantaged,
has distributed federal money to financially support state health-insurance plans that
comply with federal standards.153 The major requirement that the ACA establishes is
that the state plan expands to include adults earning no more than 133% of the
federal poverty level.154 Imposing that requirement guarantees that federal dollars
will be spent on health care for the economically disadvantaged in order to advance
Congress’ contemporary observation of the general welfare.155
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD APPLY THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST FOR DECIDING
WHETHER CONGRESS CREATED AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL COERCIVE CONDITION IN
VIOLATION OF THE SPENDING POWER BY REQUIRING A PARTICIPATING STATE TO
ACCEPT REASONABLE FEDERAL CHANGES THAT PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE
A simple application of the rational basis test to determine if spending power
coercion exists would presume that it is generally conceivable that a State would
voluntarily accept federal dollars to advance or promote the general welfare of its
citizens and that the State’s acceptance of conditional federal Medicaid grants is
entitled to a strong presumption that its acceptance of the grant does not produce
spending power coercion or a violation of States’ rights. In my opinion, the rationale
articulated by Justice Souter to support the application of the rational basis theory in
149

Id.

150

Id. at 1284-85.

151

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2634-35 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
152

Id. at 2634.
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Id.
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Id. at 2634-35.
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the context of the enumerated commerce clause power is equally applicable to a
Spending Clause analysis.156 In reviewing congressional legislation under either the
Commerce Clause or the Spending Clause, the Court should defer to an express or
implicit congressional finding that its law focuses on a topic substantially promoting
the general welfare or affecting interstate commerce if providing any rational basis
to support such a finding by Congress.157 The tradition of deferring to rationally
established legislative reasoning “is a paradigm of judicial restraint.”158 In Sebelius,
judicial review as a tool of judicial restraint under the Spending Clause would have
demonstrated the Court’s “respect for the institutional competence of the Congress
on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of the
legitimacy that comes from Congress’ political accountability in dealing with
matters open to a wide range of possible choices.”159 In Sebelius, Chief Justice
Roberts’ refusal to apply the rational basis test to Congress’ exercise of its spending
power demonstrated a lack of “respect for the competence and primacy of Congress
in matters” promoting the nation’s general welfare in the area of healthcare by
unsustainably increasing its theory of judicial review while disparaging a proper
exercise of the congressional spending power.160 Since before Sebelius, the Supreme
Court had never held that coercion actually violated the spending clause,
demonstrating how Sebelius dangerously rolled back the enumerated power of
Congress.161 The Sebelius spending power rationale suggests that the Court has an
excessive judicial appetite for expanding a style of judicial review that undermines
judicial deference because it invites future litigants to challenge the spending power
of Congress unless Congress can at least demonstrate a substantial justification for
its exercise of the spending power.162
In Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts energized and expanded the Rehnquist Court’s
federalism, with its central goal of rolling back of national power of Congress while
simultaneously expanding state’s rights.163 Under the rationale of Sebelius, the
Rehnquist Court’s goal of reducing national power has been expanded to include the
spending power.164 Before Sebelius, the spending power was generally recognized as
156

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).

157

Id. (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); see Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190 (1968) (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04
(1964))).
158

Id. at 604 (quoting Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,
314 (1993).
159
Id. (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147, 151-54 (1938); cf.
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
160

See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke it to Do So,
78 IND. L.J. 459, 460 (2003).
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See id.
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the notable exception to the Supreme Court’s rollback of the national power by
Congress because of the Court’s decision in Dole.165 As a result of Dole, several
analysts and pundits advanced the political and constitutional theory that spending
power legislation would roll back a states‘ rights federalism that actually
compromises the power of Congress.166
Those analysts and pundits who believed that Congress could enact legislation
under Dole without committing spending power coercion reasonably relied on the
fact that the majority of the lower courts had concluded that spending coercion under
Dole could occur only if a state could demonstrate it had “no practical choice.”167 If a
state could refuse the condition and nevertheless carry on in actual fact as a state,
then receiving the condition creates a freedom of choice, and the condition should
not be treated as unacceptably coercive.168 The view that a state demonstrate that it
cannot survive as a state in order for spending power coercion to exist is very
consistent with the precedents that are the basis for the decision in Dole.169 In
Sebelius, the Court energized enumerated power rollback supporters by applying a
vague spending coercion theory that gave considerably less deference to Congress
than Dole.170 In order to aggressively implement its enumerated powers rollback in
favor of the states and at the expense of Congress, the Court in Sebelius implicitly
adopted the position that a spending condition is improperly coercive if it is
conceivable that a state could believe it had either no rational choice or no fair
choice but to accept the money.171 By not applying the rational basis standard, the
Supreme Court in Sebelius adopted the rationale that the spending condition which
placed a state at risk of losing all of its Medicaid money if it refused to participate in
Medicaid expansion created spending coercion because it was conceivable that the
state had no practical choice.172 However, since it was conceivable in Sebelius that a
165

See id. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).

166

See id. (citing Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the
Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 51-52 (2003)).
167

Id. at 520.

168

See id. at 520 n.302 (citing Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“According to the coercion theory, the federal government may not, at least in certain
circumstances, condition the receipt of funds in such a way as to leave the state with no
practical alternative but to comply with federal restrictions.”)).
169

Id. at 520 (citing Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1937)
(“There must be a showing in the second place that the tax and the credit in combination are
weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of the states.” After concluding
that the tax was not coercive, the court stated, “[t]he statute does not call for a surrender by the
states of powers essential to their quasi sovereign existence.”)).
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Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

171

See id. at 2604-07.
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See Baker & Berman, supra note 163, at 520-21 n.305 (“A decade prior to Dole, one
scholar objected that ‘[d]ebating whether conditions on federal grants . . . ‘coerce’ the state is
an unhelpful anthropomorphism. . . . The question . . . is not whether federal requirements
overbear on a hypostasized state ‘free will,’ but whether they unduly compromise a normative
political conception of state autonomy.’” (quoting Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in Mandatory State Implementation of National Environmental
Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196, 1254 (1977))).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss4/8

20

2013]

FLAWED SPENDING CLAUSE COERCION REASONING

1071

State had a practical, but hard, choice not to expand Medicaid as required under the
ACA and lose all of its other Medicaid funding under the rational basis test, the
Supreme Court should have deferred to Congress under the rational basis standard
and upheld the ACA’s Medicaid expansion requirement.
In Sebelius, the Court abandoned the rational basis standard of review in order to
limit the reach of the federal spending power based on a spending power coercion
rationale that is so vague that it is impractical.173 Because the Roberts Court is
committed to a rollback of the enumerated powers of Congress, the Court no longer
applies the rational basis standard to either the commerce power or spending power
when a State challenges legislation enacted by Congress.174 The Court in Sebelius
resolved the Medicaid Expansion issue by abandoning the rationality rule in order to
support its spending power coercion theory.175 The intended enumerated power
rollback effect of the vague Sebelius coercion theory is to deny deference to
Congress. Even if it is conceivable that a state could make a hard choice to lose all of
its Medicaid funding and reasonably believe that a total loss of its Medicaid money
does not equal a total coercive destruction of the state by the federal government, the
Supreme Court’s conclusory coercion analysis in Sebelius unreasonably suggests
that Congress has robbed the state of its right to continue to exist.176
When the issue of how to adjust the standard of judicial review occurred during
the 2012 challenges by states to the Medicaid Expansion, the Roberts Court
invalidated the expansion under a vague Spending Clause coercion theory. 177 In the
process of treating the Medicaid expansion as an act of spending power coercion, the
Roberts’ Court repudiated Court precedent by refusing to defer to Congress’
judgment on how to use its spending power to promote the general welfare.178 The
judicial “matching” of the permissible conditions that Congress may place on federal
grants is the functional equivalent of elevating the degree of formal judicial scrutiny
required by the Court for its approval of spending power legislation.179 The Court
utilized an incomprehensibly vague spending power coercion theory in Sebelius. The
vague spending power theory implemented by the Court in Sebelius ignores the
rational basis standard and arbitrarily places a “direct” limit on a reasonable use of
the spending power by Congress to promote the general welfare.180
In an unsuccessful 1937 lawsuit filed by the Charles C. Steward Machine
Company against Harwell G. Davis, individually and as a Collector of Internal
Revenue for the District of Alabama challenging the validity of the tax imposed by
the Social Security Act of 1935 on employers of eight or more, the Court gave
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deference to Congress under the rational basis standard.181 The Social Security Act
of August 14, 1935 is separated into eleven distinct titles.182 The heading for Title IX
is “Tax on Employers of Eight or More.”183 Each employer (with indicated
exclusions) is to pay every calendar year “an excise tax, with respect to having
individuals in his employ,” the tax is to be calculated by prearranged percentages of
the sum of the wages payable by the employer throughout the calendar year in the
course of said employment.184
Unlike Chief Justice Roberts’ treatment of the Medicaid Expansion in Sebelius,
Justice Cardozo rejected the coercion-theory attack on the Social Security Act of
1935.185 Justice Cardozo correctly concluded that “[t]he excise tax is not void as
involving the coercion of the states in contravention of the Tenth Amendment or of
restrictions implicit in our federal form of government.”186 The states failed to
demonstrate that the Medicaid Expansion was being utilized as “weapons of
coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of the states.”187 Justice Cardozo,
unlike Chief Justice Roberts, would likely not have found a spending power coercion
violation in Sebelius. Justice Cardozo believed in order to intelligently distinguish
between coercion and encouragement, courts would be wise to defer to Congress
when using the spending power to rationally establish fiscal and economic policy to
promote the general welfare of the American people.188 In the presence of an urgent
need for a remedial measure to help the nation control healthcare cost while
simultaneously expanding Medicaid coverage to the economically-challenged, the
question to be answered is whether the Medicaid Expansion measure adopted by
Congress exceeded the scope of the spending power. Justice Cardozo rejected the
argument that the1935 Social Security Act placed “the state Legislatures under the
whip of economic pressure” that was so great that the state had no practical choice
but to ratify the unemployment compensation laws directed by the federal
government.189 Justice Cardozo correctly concluded that the federal unemployment
compensation laws did not create an unconstitutional coercion that violated the
Tenth Amendment’s implicit limits on coercive federalism.190 If Chief Justice
Roberts in Sebelius had followed the early logic used by Justice Cardozo, he would
have rejected the contention that because the ACA was designed to force the state
Legislatures under the whip of economic pressure to adopt Medicaid Expansion as
commanded by Congress, the expansion created unconstitutional spending power
181
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coercion.191 In rejecting the approach taken by Justice Cardozo, Chief Justice
Roberts apparently believes that the Medicaid Expansion provision is also a
violation of the Tenth Amendment or other limitations implicit in the his rollback
model of federalism.192 Supporters of the Medicaid Expansion rightfully contend that
its operation is not a constraint because like the Social Security Act of 1935 that was
found valid by the Court, it expands the freedom of both the states and the nation by
allowing them to join in a co-operative endeavor to solve shared problems.193
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sebelius dramatically changed the Medicaid
expansion authority of Congress and unnecessarily created a confusing spending
power coercion landscape for courts and others trying to determine the impact of
Sebelius on any future attempt by Congress to expand or otherwise modify existing
Medicaid Legislation. The Supreme Court should reverse its Medicaid expansion
holding in Sebelius and return to the rationale it adopted more than seventy-five
years ago when it refused to limit congressional spending power based on a slippery
slope coercion theory.
Since Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning is not clear and provides no significant
criteria by which to determine coerciveness, I believe the future impact of the
opinion is fairly easy to predict. In view of the fact that Roberts’ reasoning is not
clear and provides no criteria by which to determine coerciveness, everyone may
easily predict that there will be many legal challenges to the Medicaid expansion
analysis provided by Chief Justice Roberts. Chief Justice Roberts’ Medicaid
expansion coercion theory is seriously flawed because it is vague and fails to
adequately identify either the total sum or proportion of federal money at risk of
being denied or fails to properly measure when substantive changes to the Medicaid
program actually create unconstitutional coercion. Chief Justice Roberts’ coercion
rationale in Sebelius demonstrates that he has joined those who support a hostile
brand of federalism that is designed to roll back the power of Congress to promote
the general welfare of all Americans, including adults without any healthcare care
coverage.
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